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International comparison is one of the principal ways in which national governments 
nowadays seek to assess and improve the effectiveness of their policies, from delivery 
of services such as education and healthcare, to control of social issues such as crime 
and migration, to administrative functions such as tax collection. International 
organisations such as OECD and WHO have benefited from this turn to comparison, 
positioning themselves as authoritative producers of comparative data for policy 
purposes. Their success in achieving and sustaining this position owes much to their 
development of standardised and especially quantitative methods of data collection, 
analysis and publication, often in the form of easy-to-read tabulations and digests. 
The result is an international policy regime in which comparative data, and the 
international organisations that produce them, increasingly serve as key points of 
reference against which national policies must be measured and evaluated. 
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At the same time, however, many academics in the fields of political science and 
policy studies have become increasingly sceptical about just how meaningful or 
informative such standardised comparisons of national policies can actually be. 
Whereas during the 1970s and 1980s political scientists were keen to embrace the 
aims of standardised comparison as a supposedly 'scientific' means of identifying 
successful policies,1 subsequent empirical studies have increasingly highlighted the 
context-dependency of evaluation and the cultural specificity of policy and its 
meanings. While the academic impulse to comparison has by no means diminished, 
the purpose has increasingly shifted away from standardised measurement of 
effectiveness, towards a much more holistic, inductive and multi-dimensional 
appreciation of the similarities and differences between different national policy 
cultures.2 
 
Seen in this light, the increasingly widespread use of standardised comparison by 
national and international policy bodies poses something of a conundrum: if the 
lessons that can be drawn from such comparisons are, strictly speaking, of limited 
significance, then what are policy bodies doing when they do comparison? 
 
This chapter offers an answer by looking at comparison, not simply as a means of 
generating policy-relevant knowledge, but as itself a form of policy work. Based on 
an empirical study of the various initiatives through which, since the 1970s, the staff 
of the European Regional Office of the WHO have sought to learn about—and 
ultimately to reform—the provision of mental health services in different member 
countries, we offer an analysis of the rather different ways in which comparison may 
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be conducted in a policy setting. In particular, we emphasise the central role that 
knowledge of particular cases—in this instance, cases of local or national mental 
health provision—plays in the work of comparison. In so doing, we discard the 
assumption, implicit in much of the literature on “knowledge and policy”, that 
knowledge and policy can somehow be treated as distinct from one another. As 
Annabelle Littoz-Monnet observes in the introduction of this volume, writers in this 
field commonly tend to ask either how knowledge impacts on policymaking, or how 
policy interests shape the production or deployment of knowledge.3 But WHO 
Europe’s comparative studies of mental health transcended this distinction. Our view 
of the relationship between knowledge and policy is thus much closer to Sheila 
Jasanoff’s account of “co-production” in its recognition that policy is a form of 
knowledgeable action, and the production of policy knowledge is itself a way doing 
policy.4  
 
We begin by introducing WHO Europe’s developing interest in mental health – one of 
the ways in which the Europe office sought to define a distinctive role for itself within 
WHO more generally – and we examine the ways it sought to find out about different 
patterns of policy and service provision in different countries. We show how 
observers sometimes began with cases in order to identify appropriate axes of 
comparison; and sometimes by defining standardised comparative schemata that they 
then tried to apply to the cases under their purview. These different ways of knowing 
tend to be associated with two different styles of policy-making and implementation: 
bottom-up, based in local knowledge of what will and will not work locally; and top-
down, based in centralised efforts to specify what action to take locally. By following 
the different ways in which WHO has sought to produce comparative knowledge of 
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mental health provision, we thus also shed light on the different ways it has 
endeavoured to configure itself as an authoritative policy organisation.  
 
Significantly, both local case studies and cross-national surveys are produced in 
interaction among policy makers in different countries and WHO officers. They are 
generated iteratively, in a process of consultation and negotiation among experts as 
they learn how to create authoritative understandings of the world in which they 
work. In concluding, we show how the work of comparing may itself serve to make 
cases more comparable. In this sense, comparison is performative, and the imposition 
of strict criteria of comparison becomes a means of promoting the convergence or 
alignment of the various cases being compared. 
 
WHO and mental health in Europe5 
 
Established in 1948 as part of the UN system, WHO quickly incorporated mental 
health into its scope of interest. A Mental Health Unit was established at WHO 
Headquarters in 1948 and an Expert Committee on Mental Health met for the first 
time in 1949. Reviewing its activities in the sphere of mental health in 1962, WHO 
also discussed a number of study groups, conferences, consultants, meetings and 
reports that had been undertaken or were under way at that time.6 Additional study 
groups, seminars and conferences were organized jointly with other bodies, both 
governmental and non-governmental, including the World Federation for Mental 
Health, as well as ILO, UNESCO and other UN agencies. The primary function of all 
these activities was to promote communication with "representatives of developing 
countries in need of information on mental health" and/or discussion with "non-
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psychiatrists."7 From the start, then, WHO's work around mental health was centrally 
concerned with ensuring a flow of expert opinion and information across national 
boundaries. 
 
Mental health was of particular interest to WHO's Regional Office in Europe – in part 
because Europe was less affected by the infectious diseases that preoccupied other 
WHO regional offices, and saw mental health as presenting a distinctive challenge to 
tackle.8 In September 1970, its Regional Committee formally approved a "long-term 
programme" in mental health which ran until 1982, since when WHO Europe's work 
on mental health has been differentiated into more specifically defined projects. 
Responsibility for leading these activities has been vested, since the early 1970s, in a 
succession of Regional Advisers for Mental Health. From the beginning, WHO 
Europe's activities in the field of mental health have been marked by a strong 
commitment to promote community mental health alongside more institutionally-
centred forms of psychiatric care.9 
 
Central to WHO Europe's efforts to reform mental health services across the region 
has been the collection and circulation of information about the state of those services 
in member countries. These activities can be divided into two parallel strands. First, 
from the initiation of the "long-term programme" onwards, Regional Advisers for 
Mental Health have taken a recurring interest in conducting systematic surveys with 
the aim of comparing mental health service provision in different countries, and 
ultimately of identifying what kinds of provision are most effective in securing good 
mental health. Such surveys have repeatedly run into difficulties, however. The first 
Regional Adviser, Tony May, circulated a standard questionnaire to each of the thirty 
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countries in the region. His aim was explicitly "to identify developments in particular 
countries which could be useful for the Region as a whole."10 However, the returns 
were vitiated by gaps in the data, and by a lack of consistent criteria and terminology 
of reporting, precluding any possibility of rigorous comparative analysis.11 May's 
successor, John Henderson, adopted a more pragmatic approach during the early 
1980s, eschewing direct measurement of mental health impact in favour of "general 
'indicators' of progress in mental illness care" of a kind that seemed "susceptible to 
measurement in terms of the accessible information"—for instance, reduction in "the 
number of mental hospitals with more than 1000 beds."12 Even these data proved 
difficult to collect and interpret in any standardised way, however, and Henderson 
concluded that they permitted only the most limited comparison between different 
countries.13  
 
Later in the 1980s, WHO central office in Geneva launched an initiative to establish a 
new survey tool, published in 1996 as the International Classification of Mental 
Health Care (ICMHC). In practice, the ICMHC offered a sophisticated tool for 
conducting in-depth comparisons of relatively similar services, but it proved unwieldy 
as a tool for surveying mental health provision more widely.14 WHO Europe 
attempted no further systematic surveys of mental health provision until the mid-
2000s, when it developed yet another questionnaire, based not on the ICMHC but on 
the rather simpler Assessment Instrument for Mental Health Systems (AIMHS), 
developed by WHO in Geneva to identify and assess the main components of mental 
health systems in low and middle-income countries.15 This 'Baseline Survey', as it 
became known, generated a vast amount of data from a total of forty-two participating 
countries. But despite considerable care in drawing up the questionnaire, the results 
 6 
 
again defied systematic comparison, especially in Western Europe, where de-
institutionalisation and diversification of mental health services had progressed 
furthest; here, the report concluded, services "appear to be so differentiated that any 
comparison is haphazard".16 
 
In parallel with efforts to undertake a comprehensive survey of mental health 
provision, WHO Europe also pursued a second approach to eliciting and circulating 
information about the state of mental health services in member countries. In 1973, 
the first Regional Adviser, Tony May, initiated a programme of in-depth 
investigations into a series of planned innovations and "experimental services" in 
Trieste, Mannheim, Stockholm and Leningrad, as well as new initiatives in care for 
subgroups.17 Starting with nine such experiments, by the mid-1980s the programme 
had expanded to comprise a total of twenty-one so-called "pilot study areas" 
distributed across sixteen member countries.18 In contrast to WHO Europe's efforts to 
undertake systematic surveys of mental health provision in different countries, the 
pilot study areas programme was not intended to be strictly comparative. Rather than 
providing a synoptic view of "national trends" in mental health provision, it set out to 
document "a number of selected local experiments which might serve as 
demonstration models for future development".19 May and his successors as Regional 
Adviser anticipated that the pilot area studies would still lead to improvements in 
provision in other countries; but they would do so, not by demonstrating the 
comparative advantages and deficiencies of different national systems, but by 
providing a number of exemplary cases of good practice that policy makers and 
mental health practitioners elsewhere might seek to emulate.  
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Like WHO Europe's repeated efforts to conduct systematic surveys, this case-based 
approach to knowing about mental health provision in different national or local 
setting recurs repeatedly in WHO Europe's activities. In the late 1990s, for instance, 
the then Regional Adviser Wolfgang Rutz established a system of so-called national 
"counterparts", nominated by national health ministries and responsible for liaison 
with WHO in respect of mental health. Among other activities, the counterparts were 
expected to bring to the table their personal knowledge of provision in their respective 
countries. In 2001, for instance, they contributed a series of short "country reports" to 
that year's World Health Report. Eschewing any attempt at explicit international 
comparison, these country reports were expected to be "unpretentious and 
informative", providing "an impressionistic review describing the relevant efforts and 
shortcomings as experienced by the counterpart".20 
 
This approach to case-based knowledge-sharing, based in personal, often highly-
detailed knowledge of local developments, was particularly prominent in the events 
surrounding the WHO European Ministerial Conference on Mental Health, held in 
Helsinki in January 2005. The centrepiece of this conference was the approval and 
publication of two key policy documents: the Mental Health Declaration for Europe 
and the Mental Health Action Plan for Europe.21 These were pitched at a very high 
level of generality: while the Declaration was largely devoted to reasserting WHO's 
long-standing commitment to community mental health, the Action Plan identified 
twelve "challenges" on the way to achieving that goal, and listed a wide range of 
"actions to consider" as means of addressing those challenges. Neither document 
provided any empirical evidence in support of the public mental health perspective or 
the particular lines of action that they recommended; rather, they read more like a 
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statement of shared aims and values than an example of evidence-based policy. 
However, the Declaration and Action Plan were supported by a series of fourteen 
"briefing papers" covering a range of topics, including the mental health of children 
and young people, stigma and social exclusion, and suicide prevention. These papers 
provided a certain amount of statistical evidence on the epidemiology of different 
conditions and the availability of psychiatric and other kinds of mental health care 
across Europe. They also provided short qualitative case studies of the nature and 
content of particular mental health initiatives under way in different countries. Like 
the pilot study areas, these were intended to be taken as exemplary cases of good 
practice, to be emulated or at least reflected on as policy makers sought to follow the 
guidance set out in the Mental Health Action Plan.  
 
At first glance, these two approaches to building and sharing knowledge of good 
mental health practice—one based on surveys, the other based on in-depth knowledge 
of particular cases of good practice—appear quite distinct. The former is clearly 
comparative in intent, aiming to produce rigorous cross-national comparison of 
mental health provision, and of how effective such provision might be in delivering 
good mental health; while the latter appears to eschew comparison in favour of local 
'experiments' in service provision. At first sight, it might seem that there are two quite 
different, even incommensurable epistemologies in play here: one scientific in its 
appeal to universal standards of observation; the other holistic and intuitive in its 
attention to the peculiarities of individual cases. On closer analysis, however, the 
distinction between the two approaches becomes less marked, and the continuities 
more apparent; rather than different epistemologies, we might better regard them as 
involving different 'ways of knowing'. Our separation of them here is simply 
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heuristic; in reality, they are closely intertwined, evolving in a back-and-forth 
movement from one to the other as different actors seek practical solutions to what we 
might term the 'problem of comparison'. What is at stake here is not so much the 
possibility of comparison, but rather the form it might take, and the ends it might 
serve. 
 
Working with cases 
 
Let us start with the case-based approach to knowing about policy. Knowledge of 
cases, according to a long philosophical tradition, typically involves attending to what 
is particular, peculiar or idiosyncratic about those cases. But appreciation of the 
particularities of any given case is necessarily a comparative exercise: in order to 
know what is different about a case, we need to compare it to other cases. Nor are 
comparator cases usually chosen at random; rather, they tend to be selected because 
they are in some relevant way similar to the case under consideration. In other words, 
knowledge of a case necessarily involves understanding both how it resembles and 
how it differs from other cases; it depends, implicitly if not explicitly, on comparison 
with other cases. 
  
This is evident if we consider the mental health initiatives selected for investigation 
under WHO Europe's pilot study areas programme. However different those 
initiatives might have been, all were judged to be similar at least insofar as they were 
all instances of mental health provision. Additionally, all were expected "to attempt to 
define adequate and acceptable services, and to describe and evaluate the patterns of 
operational practice in the areas."22 The whole point of selecting and studying these 
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cases was to identify particular forms of provision or practice that had been 
established in one setting that could usefully be copied or adapted in another. The 
purpose of the pilot study areas programme, in other words, was to bring together a 
series of cases that could instructively be compared with one another and with 
prevailing models of mental health provision elsewhere, so that investigators, policy 
makers and practitioners could draw useful lessons about how to pursue the goals of 
mental health reform more generally.  
 
However, the architects of the pilot study areas scheme made no explicit 
recommendations for how comparison should proceed. One of the key priorities was 
to get as full an appreciation as possible of "the nuances and subtleties of 
administration, organization and function that give each service its unique 
character."23 The investigators were well aware that such detailed knowledge of 
particular cases could make systematic comparison harder rather than easier: "With 
such a wealth of data, and with the range of human experience encompassed by 
mental health services, it is not surprising that general, overall comparisons of areas 
were found impossible."24 The more one knew about particular cases, the greater the 
range of possible points of similarity and difference between them. Mental health 
professionals and policy makers seeking to learn from these cases thus faced the 
challenge of deciding what aspects of any given case were likely to be most relevant: 
not only what measures or initiatives seemed to work in their original setting, but also 
what might be transferrable into some other, different mental health system. 
Moreover, the lessons to be learned from any particular case were not necessarily 
self-evident; they had to be identified through careful consideration and evaluation of 
all the complexities of the case at hand, and all the ways it resembled and differed 
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from other cases. In effect, the whole process of comparing cases was under-
determined and open-ended, and proceeded inductively on a case-by-case basis.  
 
This had implications for how the work of comparing and learning from the different 
pilot study areas could best be organised. Consideration of just what aspects of any 
given case might or might not be salient or informative for developments elsewhere 
required an intimate understanding of that case in all its complexity, of a kind that 
could only really be achieved through direct personal experience. As one participant 
observed, "The only way to get to know how a psychiatric service functions is to 
work in it for a period of time."25 In order to explore and compare cases in the kind of 
detail required, it was therefore necessary to bring together the people who embodied 
the requisite experience. A review of the development of the pilot study areas project 
observed that "An important feature of the project was the regular, approximately 
annual meetings of the pilot study area directors and/or their representatives and 
collaborators, where the usefulness and further development of the instruments was 
discussed." These meetings provided "an important forum for the exchange of 
information about psychiatric care under greatly varying sociocultural and economic 
conditions, largely inexpressible in statistical terms."26 In effect, they were the venue 
for a process of collective exploration, through which the participants identified 
meaningful similarities and differences between their respective cases, and looked for 
ideas and practices that they could usefully incorporate into their own systems of 
mental health provision. 
 
This process of collective comparison and learning was productive in that it led to real 
improvements in mental health provision, both within the study areas themselves and 
 12 
 
elsewhere.27 In that sense, the pilot study area programme proved to be an effective 
instrument for WHO Europe to pursue its policy goals. It represented a non-
authoritarian approach to policy, however—as is apparent if we consider how 
relations between the various participants changed in the course of the programme. 
Initially, WHO officers understood themselves to be in charge of the programme, 
while the study area directors provided only "technical assistance." By the end of the 
project, however, this had been explicitly reconceived as "technical cooperation."28 
No longer mere assistants to the WHO officers, the study area directors were now 
seen as "provid[ing] the Organization with a referral network of professional authority 
and wisdom."29 Increasingly, policy-relevant expertise was now seen to be distributed 
across a network of practitioners, and not just centralised in WHO's European office. 
This flattening out of authority relations was also apparent in the way that changes 
were made to local mental health provision primarily as a result of mutual learning 
and reflection among the participants themselves, while the role of the WHO Europe 
office in directing or mandating them appears to have been limited.  
 
This approach to policy was particularly evident in the events surrounding the 2005 
Ministerial Conference in Helsinki and the launch of the Mental Health Declaration 
and Action Plan.30 As the architects of the conference were aware, any Europe-wide 
mental health policy would have to be applicable across a diverse range of contexts, 
from the relatively specialised, community-based mental health services found in 
Scandinavia, the UK, Germany and the Netherlands, to the much more basic, 
institutionally-based psychiatric services found elsewhere in Europe. Hence the 
decision to eschew strongly prescriptive and standardised guidelines that would be 
difficult to apply across such different situations, and instead to use the Declaration 
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and Action Plan to reassert the general values and principles of community mental 
health. More specific suggestions for action were represented in the accompanying 
briefing documents in the form of exemplary cases of good practice that national 
policymakers and practitioners could adapt to their own local needs.31 In compiling 
these briefing documents, WHO Europe again mobilised its network of local experts, 
expanded now to include not just academics and practitioners but also "experts by 
experience"—notably mental health service users—bringing them together in a series 
of pre-meetings to select examples that best reflected the values and principles 
represented in the Declaration and Action Plan.  
 
Subsequent efforts to implement those values and principles in mental health practice 
likewise revolved primarily around face-to-face meetings and reflection on local 
needs. In the wake of the Helsinki conference, WHO Europe sponsored a series of 
conferences and meetings in member countries, co-chaired by WHO and an in-
country host organization. Sometimes the Regional Adviser on Mental Health would 
be present to outline the principles set out in the Declaration and Action Plan, while 
the national counterpart would respond with a discussion of the particular situation 
that obtained in the host country. As one of our respondents recalled, this 
juxtaposition of general principles with local particularities, although "a very 
imprecise process", nonetheless provided a means of stimulating local policy 
development.32 Other meetings served primarily as opportunities for sharing best 
practice, providing "technical assistance", and "pressing and cajoling" local policy 
makers and practitioners, as another of our respondents put it.33 Here too, however, 
the power to decide exactly how WHO policies should be put into practice remained 
very much in the hands of local policy makers and practitioners. Local and national 
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policy makers were at liberty, should they so wish, to appropriate WHO policy 
initiatives in ways that bore little resemblance to WHO Europe's vision of community 
mental health—as happened for instance when Hungarian psychiatrists invoked the 
Mental Health Declaration for Europe to legitimise and reinforce their own preferred 
institutional and professional authority structures.34 
 
In working this way, then, policy makers come to know their domain of action 
through collective reflection on the meaning of exemplary cases, and informed 
consideration of how those cases might be emulated locally. But exemplary cases are 
brought into relief and their significance made clear only in relation to other cases: 
through comparison. Such comparison may be explicit or, more often, implicit. But it 
is typically an open-ended, mutualistic way of knowing and ultimately of acting, 
negotiated in meetings of knowledgeable practitioners—not authoritarian and 
prescriptive, but collaborative, exploratory and adaptive. 
 
Conducting surveys 
 
Let us turn now to consider the efforts that WHO Europe has made since the early 
1970s to conduct more explicitly comparative, systematic surveys of mental health 
provision in its member countries. Given the difficulties that the Organisation and its 
officials experienced in executing such surveys, and their continuing failure to deliver 
a strictly comparative analysis of mental health provision, it is tempting to suppose 
that their efforts in this direction were simply wasted. Again, this would be to 
misunderstand what happens in the work of comparison, and the role it plays in policy 
work more generally. Certainly, none of those involved in the surveys took the view 
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that they had been a waste of time. Commenting on May's first survey, for instance, 
his successor as Regional Adviser took the view that while the findings did not permit 
strict comparison, they were nonetheless informative: "A series of imprecise yet 
recognizable patterns had emerged, which could provide the basis for future policy 
statements and inquiries."35 How are we to understand this? If a survey fails to deliver 
strictly comparative data, how might it nonetheless contribute to the production of 
useful policy knowledge and to the formulation and implementation of policy? 
 
Surveys, too, involve knowledge of cases—but they proceed in a very different way. 
Rather than allowing the axes of comparison to emerge inductively, in the course of 
open-ended discussion, surveys begin by defining in advance what aspects of cases 
will be compared. And it was this that proved so difficult in WHO Europe's attempts 
to survey mental health provision across its member countries. In many instances, the 
categories of knowledge or data specified in the survey instruments proved to be 
inapplicable to the local reality of particular mental health care systems; and even 
where they could be applied, the data often proved not to exist, or were only patchily 
available. As a result, the surveys consistently failed to produce the kind of 
standardised data that would support strictly deductive comparison between cases. 
That did not mean that the surveys did not permit any kind of comparison at all, 
however. While the data they produced were patchy and inconsistent, they were 
nonetheless sufficient to enable researchers to identify elements of similarity and 
difference between different cases—to support a more inductive approach to 
comparison. It was this kind of inductive reasoning that enabled WHO researchers to 
identify the "imprecise yet recognizable patterns" which "emerged" from May's 
survey,36 even when that survey failed to produce strictly comparable data. Moreover, 
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the kinds of data generated by the WHO surveys were not necessarily confined to 
what was specified in the survey instruments. When Henderson and his colleagues 
came to analyse their own, similarly patchy survey results, they also incorporated 
supplementary data, corrections, amendments and discussions that had subsequently 
been provided by colleagues in member countries;37 in this instance, the survey 
findings were informed as much by inductive reasoning from local knowledge of 
particular cases as by strict deduction from standardised data.  
 
The work of conducting surveys is thus not simply a matter of generating the kind of 
standardised data from which deductive conclusions can be drawn; nor is it solely 
about the imposition of a centralised, top-down way of knowing and comparing. 
While survey designers may typically aim to generate this kind of knowledge, the 
development and conduct of a survey is in many cases directly informed by inductive 
reasoning from in-depth experience of local cases. Strict, systematic comparison, in 
other words, is frequently only made possible by prior comparative work of a much 
more informal kind. Moreover, later surveys often learn from and build on earlier 
ones. Thus the baseline survey was in part designed to remedy some of the 
shortcomings of Henderson's study, which was in turn explicitly informed by the 
difficulties encountered by May's survey. Where we find repeated attempts to survey 
the same domain of policy activity, then, there may be good reason to think of such 
attempts as involving an incremental process of exploration, as WHO officers sought 
by trial and error to determine the most useful categories for generating comparative 
data. 
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At the same time, the work of conducting a survey may in some cases actually help to 
make the domain under investigation more amenable to standardised comparison. 
Though the data produced by May's survey were not strictly comparable, for instance, 
he subsequently noted that the countries involved had in many cases gone to 
considerable lengths in repeatedly checking information available to them, and in 
some instances undertaking specific, new information-gathering exercises. "Besides 
disclosing to countries themselves the gaps and deficiencies in their basic data," he 
observed, "the personal contact with administrators and statisticians which was 
entailed by the survey has stimulated their efforts to improve their mental health 
information systems."38 This informal process of education had in some instances led 
to more formal training: "A practical result of the present survey has been the 
organization of an annual series of courses on the collection, interpretation and 
application of mental health statistics, attended by psychiatrists, statisticians and 
administrators, and designed to explore the use of statistics in monitoring and 
planning for services."39 In reflecting on the outcomes of their own survey, 
Henderson and his colleagues observed that this was one of the specific strengths of 
WHO's efforts in the field of mental health policy: "In particular, the improved 
collection of information on mental health services is an activity deserving 
collaboration, for which WHO is the most appropriate international agency."40 The 
baseline study of 2006 to 2008 marked another step in the same direction. Under the 
baseline study, data collection involved "a partnership process" or "dialogue"41 
between the central research team and the country partners, which had an educative as 
much as a supervisory function: "As a side effect some countries discovered how to 
collect data for themselves," reported one of our respondents.42 As a result, the kind 
of data about mental health provision that are routinely produced in different 
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countries have become more standardised, and hence more comparable, than ever 
before.  
 
In this regard, the work of conducting surveys may often be performative, in the sense 
that the very act of doing comparison may result in improvement in the degree of 
comparability of the phenomena being studied. Successive surveys have led to 
increasing standardisation of national information systems, as member countries have 
converged around a common interest in international comparison.43 In so doing, they 
have conferred a significant measure of authority on WHO Europe itself. In effect, the 
Regional Adviser's office has been granted the power to determine the categories 
according to which national mental health systems should be observed, measured and 
compared, and hence how they should be organised and what values and aims they 
should embody. As one of our respondents put it: "These are very simplistic and yet 
authoritative ways of recording what you're about and what you're expecting to be 
about."44 
 
So what do WHO's assembled experts now know of mental health in Europe, and how 
do they know it?  The survey, like the Pilot Area Studies and more ad hoc discussion 
of different national arrangements, is a form of comparison involving cases. It is a 
special case of case-based comparison more generally, and one which seems to entail 
different kinds of social and political relations. What is special about surveys is that 
they require and reflect a unitary, authoritative capacity to fix the terms of 
comparison: a top-down strategy that favours a more centralised, hierarchical 
production of knowledge than the flatter relationships implied in a more inductive 
case-based approach. Nevertheless, as this section has shown, the making of 
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comparison still turns to a considerable extent on the collaboration of national and 
local partners in agreeing and even determining what kinds of parameters may be 
observed in comparing one country with another. Survey criteria are themselves 
informed by inductive, case-based knowledge of local circumstances; while 
authoritative comparison is only achieved with the active participation of those 
subject to it. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Surveys and case studies are often treated as dichotomous: as distinct epistemologies 
producing very different kinds of knowledge. Here, in our study of WHO, we have 
tried to show that they are actually instances of the same thing—of comparison—and 
that the relationship between them is intricate and sustained. While they clearly differ, 
that difference is one of degree, not of kind; surveys and case studies differ in the 
emphasis they place on different kinds of work, and in the way that work is organized. 
In both cases, knowledge is a collective achievement of knowledgeable actors; and in 
both cases, comparability is negotiated with others, in the back-and-forth of data-
gathering and discussion, judged according to the standards emergent in those 
interactions. Our history of knowledge production at WHO is thus one of cases and 
surveys, but it is also a story of meetings—of seminars, working groups and countless 
other, less formal occasions at which both surveys and case studies were collectively 
conceived, problematized and debated. At the same time, the conduct and outcomes 
of those meetings was conditioned by the wider social and political relations within 
which they took place, while the different kinds of comparison they enacted reflected, 
reproduced and sometimes subtly shifted those relations. Seen in this light, the 
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emergence and consolidation of the cross-national survey within WHO was itself 
political—a centralizing move, which served to establish WHO as a key actor in 
determining what would count as the best knowledge for policy, and hence in the 
work of policy itself.  
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